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Abstract 
The sense of optimism for the enlargement of the European Union in the near-future has been 
evaporating. A new strategy paper on EU enlargement which was issued by the European 
Commission in February 2018 seems to still be based on a ‘fatigue from expansion’ approach to 
enlargement, even though it states that Serbia and Montenegro ‘could potentially be ready for 
membership [by] 2025’. This paper discusses the bumpy road the Western Balkan states have faced 
towards EU accession from the early 2000s to the present day. In addition to more challenging 
domestic political and economic conditions, these states have also been required to meet tougher and 
more variable accession conditions in comparison to the post-communist states that joined the EU in 
and after 2004. The inconsistency and vagueness of the EU approach to the accession of the Western 
Balkan states remains the most important factor behind the continued postponements of their 
accession dates.  
Keywords: EU enlargement, Western Balkans, conditions, vague approach 
The enlargement policy is a key instrument for the European Union (EU) to promote 
democracy, rule of law and human rights (Börzel and Schimmelfennig, 2017). The 
‘golden carrot’ of accession has been identified as the core of the EU’s integration 
capacity beyond its borders (Börzel et al., 2017). Enlargement has a wide range of 
impacts and consequences on actors, ranging from the decision-making processes to 
institutional structures and transformations. For this reason, the enlargement process 
closely influences the public discourse and increasingly affects the political agenda and 
voter behaviour (Larsen, 2010). 
The conceptualisation of the EU’s policy towards the Western Balkans is marked by a 
strong democratic conditionality and different levels of the EU’s involvement in the 
regional dynamics. The conditions set out at the Copenhagen European Council in 
1993 were designed to minimise the risk of new entrants becoming politically unstable 
and economically burdensome to the existing EU (Grabbe, 2006). The establishment 
of democracies and market economies in the EU has advanced side by side with the 
promotion of human rights and the rule of law. This set of concepts and/or core norms 
on which the EU was established (Manners, 2002) has been successfully promoted in 
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the immediate vicinity of the Union, East Central Europe, the Baltics and the Western 
Balkans.  
However, this set of the EU’s norms has not been promoted with the same success in 
all the European countries and regions which were exposed to its promotion. Some key 
benchmarks which the EU has set regarding compliance with the Copenhagen 
conditions, particularly the ability of the candidate countries to successfully strengthen 
democratic institutions, respect for the rule of law and human rights, the fight against 
corruption, and the peaceful settlement of disputes, seemed to be more challenging for 
the post-communist countries from the Western Balkans than for their counterparts 
from Central Europe and the Baltics. Moreover, the EU has been firmer regarding 
compliance with the Copenhagen accession criteria for new candidates since the 2004-
07 enlargement round, and that has caused subsequently slower progress in 
association/accession and stagnation in post-communist reform (Petrovic, 2013). In 
fact, in 2006, the European Council introduced a tougher tool for the adoption and 
implementation of acquis chapters for the current and new membership candidate 
countries. The Western Balkan aspiring members are facing an additional set of 
politically sensitive conditions, often colloquially referred to as the ‘Copenhagen Plus’ 
criteria, which relates to the respect for and implementation of various political and 
peace agreements stemming mostly from the armed conflicts of the 1990s (European 
Commission, 2006). 
EU enlargement with the determination of the Copenhagen Criteria was first portrayed 
as an indispensable tool for the transfer of ‘European values’. For this purpose, it has 
been argued that EU expansion to the East aims to spread European values to non-EU 
counties. According to Diez (2005, p. 630), the Copenhagen Criteria themselves are 
evidence of this priority mission of the EU. Manners (2002) supported this argument 
and defined the change and transformation that takes place in the candidate countries 
under the influence of membership conditions as the “normative power of Europe”. 
Especially after the so-called “big bang” enlargement of 2004, a rhetoric has been 
developed to "unite the East and the West of Europe" and eventually has given the EU 
an unprecedented influence in the region by the creation of rules and the transfer of 
given EU rules internally and externally (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004).  
Preoccupied with dealing with its internal challenges (such as BREXIT, the refugee 
crisis, the rise of nationalism), the EU’s enlargement policy for the ‘unification of the 
East and the West of Europe’ has been frozen on an ‘auto-pilot mode’ (Kmezić and 
Bieber, 2016). However, the president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude 
Junker, in his 2017 ‘State of the Union address’ announced that the ‘wind is back in 
EU’s sails’ and that the EU must maintain a credible enlargement perspective for the 
Western Balkans (European Commission, 2017). In order to stimulate this process, the 
European Commission adopted a new strategy for enlargement into the Western 
Balkans (European Commission, 2018). The document states that the EU ‘could’ 
become larger than 27 Members by 2025. The European Commission would like to 
speed up the accession of the Western Balkans to the EU but once the tightened 
Copenhagen Criteria are met. The priorities are: the rule of law and judicial reforms, 
fundamental rights, economic development and competitiveness and good 
neighbourly relations (European Commission, 2018, p. 6). 
Previously, Brussels had announced the prospects for EU membership in the Western 





in February 2018, this prospect was firstly confirmed and, secondly, the specific date 
of the first possible accession was announced – 2025. ‘With strong political will, the 
delivery of real and sustained reforms and definitive solutions to disputes with 
neighbours’, Serbia and Montenegro could potentially be ready for membership in a 
2025 perspective (European Commission, 2018, p. 2). Back in 2014, Jean-Claude 
Juncker, at that time a candidate for the presidency of the European Commission, 
announced that the EU was in need of a break from enlargement to ‘consolidate what 
has been achieved among the 28’ (Juncker, 2014, p. 12). In his opening statement in 
the European Parliament plenary session, Junker advocated keeping a European 
perspective for the Western Balkans, but with no further enlargement over the 
succeeding five years. 
Montenegro and Serbia are the current front-runners in the accession process. They 
are currently the only candidates engaged in accession negotiations, but Serbia in 
particular faces serious challenges on its way to accession. It is required to meet interim 
benchmarks related to the normalisation of relations with Kosovo (Chapter 35) and to 
sign a comprehensive, legally binding agreement with Kosovi, if it wants to complete 
its accession (European Commission, 2018) as discussed in Petrovic and Wilson’s 
contribution to this issue. 
From 2019, after the election of the European Parliament, a new political cycle in the 
EU will begin. Therefore, the European Commission has already set common tasks for 
this period in relation to the Western Balkans. If the set of goals is achieved, then by 
the end of the next cycle the European Union might admit new members – specifically 
Serbia and Montenegro. The chance of membership for these states will give an 
impetus to other countries from the Western Balkans to intensify their European 
aspirations and belief that the European perspectives are real. 
The possible accession of Serbia and Montenegro in 2025 will be the first enlargement 
of the EU since 2013, when the first state from the Western Balkans, Croatia, was 
accepted as a new member of the Union. However, membership for Serbia and 
Montenegro is not guaranteed in 2025. President Juncker has announced that the EU 
would not accept any new members with unresolved territorial issues (RFE/RL’s 
Balkan Service, 2018). The reference in this announcement is the hitherto unresolved 
territorial and maritime dispute between Croatia and Slovenia. Prior to Croatia’s EU 
accession on 1 July 2013, this conflict had led to a blockade of the accession 
negotiations of Croatia by Slovenia, thus creating some coercive momentum to ‘solve’ 
the conflict during Croatia’s accession negotiations (Bickl, 2017). Despite the fact that 
the International Arbitration Court in The Hague in June 2017 ruled in favour of 
Slovenia, Croatia has so far refused to accept and comply with the international 
arbitration ruling, despite the pressures from Brussels (Ilić, 2017). This case shows that 
during any bilateral issues, the member state(s) of the European Union might use their 
‘inside-the-club’ status to enforce their position vis-à-vis candidate countries 
(Uilenreef, 2010; Bickl, 2017). Nevertheless, Croatia, with unresolved territorial 
disputes, had managed to become the member of the EU, while a similar pattern of 
bilateral issues introduced into accession negotiations has appeared to emerge in the 
ongoing negotiations between the EU and Serbia over Kosovo. If the EU adheres to the 
present operational design of dealing with bilateral questions in the context of 
accession negotiations (for example the Slovenia-Croatia border dispute per se), EU 
enlargement might be at risk in the foreseeable future. 
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In addition to the obligation for the candidate countries to settle their disputes 
peacefully, they continue to be required to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria – especially 
with regard to ensuring the rule of law, economic stability and the ability of the state 
to apply the necessary reforms. The reforms and changes to their legal and institutional 
order that the Western Balkan candidates for EU membership need to introduce in 
order to address the EU’s conditional policy demands require significant funding by 
means of the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) and other forms of EU 
financial and technical help. As the new strategy of the European Commission to the 
Western Balkans states: ‘to ensure a smooth transition to membership, it is necessary 
to ensure adequate funding’ (European Commission, 2018, p. 18). 
In this regard, the European Commission has proposed an insignificant increase in the 
Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance II. The Instrument for Pre-accession 
Assistance (IPA) targets countries that are candidates or potential candidates for EU 
membership. The program supports adopting and implementing the EU acquis 
communitaire, namely political, institutional, legal, administrative, social and 
economic reforms (European Commission, 2014b). The first IPA regulation came into 
force in 2007, which replaced the pre-accession assistance programs, delivered under 
several thematic (PHARE, SAPARD, ISPA) and geographical (CARDS) instruments 
(Koeth, 2014). For the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework (MFF), the 
European Commission implemented regulations (No 231/2014), which established an 
Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance named IPA II (European Commission, 
2014b). For the period 2007-2013, IPA I had a budget of  EUR 11.5 billion, while its 
successor, IPA II will have EUR 11.7 billion for the period 2014-2020 (Koeth, 2014). 
The new IPA II clearly reflects the fact that the enlargement process was in a holding 
pattern. According to the new strategic paper (European Commission, 2018), the 
Commission proposes gradually increased funding under the Instrument for Pre-
Accession Assistance to cater for possible accessions. 
Most of the EU’s financial assistance to the Western Balkans goes to sectoral reforms 
to strengthen the rule of law, sustainable economic development, competitiveness, 
democracy and judiciary. It is noteworthy that these target those areas in which the 
European Commission sees the biggest deficit. The new strategic document states the 
region should take these fundamental values of the EU much more resolutely and 
reliably (European Commission, 2018). The Western Balkan economies are 
characterised by a lack of competitiveness due to excessive political interference and 
insufficient development of the private sector, which slows growth and reduces 
employment prospects for young people (The World Bank Group, 2017). It is obvious 
that the Western Balkan countries are in need of economic reform programs. 
According to the World Bank, the medium term economic outlook is rather positive: 
growth is projected to reach 3.6 per cent by 2019 which would be significantly above 






Table 1.1: The medium-term growth outlook for the Western Balkans 
Real GDP growth (annual 
rates) 
2016 2017 2018 2019 
Albania 3.4 3.8 3.6 3.5 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.1 3.0 3.2 3.4 
Kosovo 3.4 4.4 4.8 4.8 
Macedonia, FYR 2.4 1.5 3.2 3.9 
Montenegro 2.9 4.2 2.8 2.5 
Serbia 2.8 2.0 3.0 3.5 
WB6 2.9 2.6 3.3 3.6 
Source: The World Bank Group, 2017 
However, even if these figures are achieved, the economies of the Western Balkans will 
need at least 15 to 20 years to catch up to the EU’s average economic performance 
(Fouéré, 2018).  
The large-scale military violence that devastated the region in the 1990s is no longer 
an urgent problem for the Balkans. Even so, economic weakness, growing public 
frustration and unemployment are the main local irritants for European integration 
(Börzel and Sedelmeier, 2017; The World Bank Group, 2017; Fouéré, 2018). In order 
to reverse the current trends, the resolution of economic problems is an obvious means 
of achieving concrete political results. Therefore, the increased funding is required to 
ensure steady growth and successful European integration.  
Past experiences show that the EU has tried to gradually extend the European 
perspective in Western Balkan countries. The European Commission’s ‘three pillar’ 
approach introduced during 2012-2014 (see the Introduction to this issue) which 
brought chapters 23 (judicial system and fundamental human rights) and 24 (justice, 
freedom and security) into the centre of the EU accession process aimed to better 
prepare the candidate countries for accession and therewith ‘ensure [that] 
enlargement is not at the expense of the effectiveness of the Union’ (European 
Commission, 2014a, p.1). These chapters have to be ‘opened early in the process and 
closed at the end to allow maximum time for solid track records to develop with the 
aim of irreversibility of reforms’ (European Commission, 2014a, p.1). More recently 
there was the launch of the Berlin Process, which consists of high-level meetings 
between the six Western Balkan governments and several EU Member States. These 
efforts were made to keep optimism about EU membership high in the Balkans and 
refresh the European perspective (Vurmo, 2018). However, in addition to making the 
EU accession process tougher for the Western Balkan candidates, these attempts were 
rather narrow and were not able to capture the new socio-economic realities in the 
region such as (still) high unemployment, low living standards and an increase in 
public frustration.  
Moreover, the (real) motives behind the EU’s Enlargement strategy of February 2018 
might be more related to the EU’s geo-political confrontation with Russia than a 
genuine attempt at stimulating further reforms and faster accession in the Western 
Balkan states. The EU fears that the countries of the Western Balkans may fall under 
the greater influence of Russia, China, and/or Turkey and move away from Europe 
(Bieri, 2015; Orosz, 2018). Thus, the new strategy of the European Commission for a 
credible enlargement perspective is a response to Russia's attempts to build political 
influence in the region, as well as to the growing economic activity of China and the 
cultural influence of Turkey.  
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Regardless, EU foreign ministers disagreed over the integration of the Western 
Balkans at a European Council meeting that took place in Sofia on 17 May 2018. The 
meeting discussed the updated EU strategy for the Western Balkans. During the 
discussion, the European Council split into ‘optimists’ and ‘skeptics; in relation to the 
European perspective for the Western Balkans. ‘Optimist’ Hungarian Foreign 
Minister, Peter Szijjarto, said that the European Union ‘is extremely slow when it 
comes to issues in the Western Balkans’ (euobserver, 2018). According to him, Serbia 
and Montenegro could join the bloc by 2022. The Austrian Foreign Minister supported 
this idea in favour of the accelerated integration of the region. 
From the ‘skeptics bloc’ Slovenian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Karl Erjavec, warned 
that even the 2025 target was “not realistic” due to ongoing border disputes among 
former Yugoslav countries (euobserver, 2018). 
Despite the fact that both ‘optimists’ and ‘sceptics’ from the EU have (at least 
rhetorically) ‘welcomed’ and ‘supported’ the Western Balkan countries’ in advancing 
their European values, and aspirations for EU membership (European Council, 2018) 
for 15 years since the Thessaloniki summit, the Western Balkan summit in Sofia clearly 
showed a vague and equivocal support of the leaders of core EU member states for the 
“European perspective” of the Balkans. Until recently, "fatigue from expansion" has 
reigned in the European Union. A stalled expansion has reduced the enlargement drive 
in the Western Balkans and greatly increased the public frustration.  
With regards to EU accession prospects, pessimism continues to grow (Figure 1.1) 
given that there were fewer people in 2016 who forecast accession to the EU as early as 
2020 (2014:27 per cent ; 2015: 24 per cent; 2016: 19 per cent). The highest proportion 
of respondents still feels that their country will never integrate into the EU (28 per 
cent), with pessimists particularly numerous in Bosnia and Herzegovina (33 per cent) 
and Serbia (38 per cent) (Balkan Barometer, 2017).  
Figure 1.1: Percentage distribution of answers to the question: ‘In general, when do you expect the accession to EU 
to happen?’ 
 





Needless to say, for the admission of new members to the European Union the 
unanimous support of all the current EU states is needed. The Accession Treaty will be 
examined by the Commission, EU Council and the European Parliament before a 
unanimous decision is adopted by the Council of the European Union. The Treaty is, 
subsequently, signed by the candidate country and by representatives of all EU 
Member States (European Commission, 2015). The European Council ministerial 
meeting showed that there might be at least one recalcitrant and ‘receptive’ 
government from the ‘skeptic’s bloc’ to overturn the entire construction of the 
accession of the Western Balkans. Hence, the Balkan countries might not become 
members in the foreseeable future, not due to the lack of reforms, but due to political 
deadlocks. 
Therefore, it seems fair to say that so far, the adoption of the updated EU strategy for 
the Western Balkans has not gone much further than encouraging Serbia to recognise 
Kosovo. It remains to be seen how far the European Commission will be able to 
advance its proposals on the accession of the Western Balkans by 2025. 
The lack of financial assistance, vague accession dates, the same wording of the 
"European Perspective" and skeptical heads of the member states are the reason for 
today's less optimistic view on prospects for enlargement of the European Union in the 
near future. There are several reasons why the integration of the Western Balkans in 
general, and Serbia in particular, is so slow. As noted above, they can be divided into 
internal and external. But one of the most important catalysts lies in the inconsistency 
and vagueness of the EU ‘approach’ to the accession of the Western Balkan states. In a 
nutshell, conditionality works well if membership criteria are clear, if the same criteria 
are applied to all applicants, if they are strictly but fairly monitored, if the findings are 
transparently communicated, and if there is no doubt that the reward will come, once 
conditions are met. 
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